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ABSTRACT 
 
 Prior research generally finds that firms underreport option expense by managing 
assumptions underlying option valuation (e.g. they shorten the expected option lives), but it fails 
to document management of a key assumption, the one concerning expected stock-price 
volatility.  Using a new methodology, we address two questions:  (1) To what extent do 
companies follow the guidance in FAS 123 and use forward looking information in addition to 
the readily available historical volatility in estimating expected volatility?  (2) What determines 
the cross-sectional variation in the reliance on forward looking information?  We find that firms 
use both historical and forward-looking information in deriving expected volatility.  We also 
find, however, that the reliance on forward-looking information is limited to situations where this 
reliance results in reduced expected volatility and thus smaller option expense.  We interpret this 
finding as managers opportunistically use the discretion in estimating expected volatility 
afforded by FAS 123.  In support of this interpretation, we also find that managerial incentives 
play a key role in this opportunism. 
 
Keywords:  executive stock options; forward-looking information; SFAS No. 123; implied 
volatility. 
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Stock Option Expense, Forward-looking Information, 
and Implied Volatilities of Traded Options 
1. Introduction 
 There is no shortage of theoretical models of employee stock option (ESO) value in the 
academic literature (see, e.g., Hemmer, Matsunaga, and Shevlin 1994, and Carpenter 1998).  
Still, for a variety of reasons (e.g., the difficulty in assessing the empirical validity of these 
models) many firms use the Black-Scholes model to value their ESO, although ESO clearly 
violate important assumptions underlying this model (e.g., Black-Scholes assumes a diffusion 
process and values European calls, whereas in reality stock prices may jump and nearly all ESOs 
are American calls). 
While the decision to use the Black-Scholes model may be controversial, there is little 
disagreement that given that decision, a key parameter underlying the fair value of options is the 
expected volatility of the underlying stock price.  For example, Brenner and Subrahmanyam 
(1994) show that for options whose strike price equals the forward price of the stock, option 
value is proportional to volatility.  Thus, a change in the volatility parameter will yield the same 
percentage change in the value of the option (e.g., a decrease in expected volatility from 30 
percent to 27 percent will reduce estimated option value by 10 percent). 
Statement of Financial Accounting Standards (SFAS) No. 123, Accounting for Stock-
Based Compensation, guides that when estimating the fair value of options granted to employees 
“the assumptions about expected volatility … should be based on historical experience, adjusted 
for publicly available information that may indicate ways in which the future is reasonably 
expected to differ from the past” (para. 251).  SFAS No. 123 further states, “In some 
circumstances, identifiable factors may indicate that unadjusted historical experience is a 
relatively poor predictor of future experience” (para. 276).  This caveat is underscored repeatedly 
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in the statement, including in para. 278: “The Board does not intend for an entity to base option 
values on historical average option lives, stock volatility, or dividends … without considering the 
extent to which historical experience reasonably predicts future experience.”  Moreover, para. 
285 specifically guides that the entity should consider “the mean-reversion tendency of 
volatilities” in estimating expected volatility. 
 Thus, while SFAS No. 123 directs that estimates of expected volatility be based on 
historical experience, it clearly indicates that other available information should be considered as 
well.  This provides firms with significant discretion in estimating the expected volatility of their 
stock price and thus the value of ESOs.  Furthermore, enforcement actions against firms 
reporting unexpectedly low expected volatility and consequently low ESO expense are unlikely, 
as the stock option value “is a projection of a financial item entitled to safe harbor protections, as 
are the underlying assumptions” (U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) 1993).  
Given the flexibility inherent in estimating stock-price volatility and the importance of this 
assumption in determining ESO expense, one may expect firms to manage the volatility estimate.  
Yet, prior studies (e.g., Aboody et al. 2003, and Balsam et al. 2003) report insignificant 
correlations between the volatility assumption and proxies for firm incentives to understate the 
pro-forma option expense. 
This study investigates the determinants of the volatility assumption using a new 
approach.  Its purpose is twofold.  The first is to examine the extent to which companies follow 
the guidance of SFAS No. 123 and use forward-looking information in addition to the readily 
available historical volatility in estimating expected volatility.  More importantly, the second 
purpose is to investigate the cross-sectional variation in the tendency of firms to incorporate such 
information.  In particular, are firms more likely to incorporate forward-looking information 
 3 
when that information implies low volatility and hence small option expense?  If so, are 
corporate executives more likely to incorporate forward-looking information that indicates small 
option expense when their option holdings or the intensity of ESO granting are relatively large?  
 Examining these questions requires a variable reflecting forward-looking expected 
volatility information.  For companies with traded call or put options, such variable can be 
derived from observed option prices.  Specifically, by inverting the option pricing formula, one 
is able to estimate the implied stock price volatility used by investors in setting the option price.  
In an efficient capital market, this estimate reflects both historical and forward-looking 
information.  Thus, the incremental relationship between disclosed and implied volatilities, after 
controlling for historical volatility, should indicate the extent to which disclosed volatility 
contains forward-looking expected volatility information. 
 We find that managers use both historical and implied volatilities in determining the 
expected volatility parameter used in the calculation of option values and thus option expense.  
This finding appears to indicate that managers are literally following the dictum in SFAS No. 
123 that they ought to incorporate both historical and forward-looking information in the 
estimation of stock price volatility.  Further investigation, however, demonstrates that the weight 
assigned to implied volatility is significant only when implied volatility is low relative to 
historical volatility (i.e., when using implied volatility results in a small option expense); the 
weight on implied volatility is insignificant when implied volatility is high relative to historical 
volatility.  One way to interpret this finding is that managers use the discretion in SFAS No. 123 
regarding incorporating forward-looking information into the expected volatility estimate 
opportunistically to underreport option expense.  In support of this interpretation we also find 
that managerial incentives play a key role in this opportunism.  Managers estimate volatility in 
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an opportunistic fashion primarily when their option holdings are large or when the firm belongs 
to an industry with high ESO granting intensity. 
Our study helps reconcile a perplexing set of results in the extant accounting literature.  
Specifically, on one hand prior research shows that firms manage assumptions underlying the 
pro-forma option expense.  For example, Yermack (1998) asserts that “companies shorten the 
expected lives of stock options and unilaterally apply discounts to the Black-Scholes formula,” 
and Aboody et al. (2003, p. 23) echo similar sentiment, “firms that have CEOs with perceived 
excessive pay understate option value estimates by assuming shorter option lives.”  On the other 
hand, prior research fails to show that firms exploit the flexibility in estimating stock-price 
volatility to manage option expense.  For example, Aboody et al. (2003, p. 25) conclude that 
their results provide “no evidence that concerns about perceived profitability and political costs 
of executive pay motivate firms to manage downward expected stock volatility.”  Using a new 
methodology that involves comparing the volatility parameters on both historical volatility and 
implied volatility in explaining expected volatility, we document that corporate executives 
exploit discretion in SFAS No. 123 to understate stock-price volatility estimate when valuing 
stock options.  Furthermore, this behavior relates to managerial incentives to understate option 
expense.  Our findings thus resolve an apparent inconsistency in prior research findings, as well 
as highlight a potential concern associated with allowing corporate executives substantial 
discretion in estimating stock-option values.1 
Our findings also contribute to extant literature by showing that managers use forward-
looking information when estimating expected stock-price volatility.  Prior research has 
                                                 
1
 To verify that the difference between our findings and those of Aboody et al. (2003) is due to the methodology we 
use rather than the sample, we estimate their regression model using our data and find similar results to those 
reported in Aboody et al. (2003).  Specifically, disclosed volatility is not related to proxies for incentives to manage 
the pro-forma option expense. 
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associated the use of unexpectedly low estimates in valuing options with managerial confusion 
surrounding the Black-Scholes model.  For example, Yermack (1998, p. 215) argues that in 
justifying to shareholders the use of low option expected lives “companies generally ignore or 
misrepresent the financial theories that might support such changes.”  In contrast, our findings 
indicate that corporate executives do understand the Black-Scholes model and its underlying 
assumptions.  What may explain this difference between Yermack’s and the current study’s 
conclusions?  One plausible answer is the sample period.  Yermack’s (1998) sample spans the 
years 1993-1994, whereas ours covers the period 1996-2001.  Thus Yermack findings indicate 
that in the early years of implementation firms were confused about the Black-Scholes model, 
while our findings suggest that in later years the confusion no longer exists (most likely due to 
learning). 
 The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 develops the empirical 
tests.  Section 3 outlines the sample selection procedure and defines the variables.  Section 4 
presents the empirical findings, and Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Development of the Empirical Tests 
 To test our first research question, the one concerning whether firms follow the guidance 
in SFAS No. 123 and use both historical and forward looking information in deriving expected 
volatility, we estimate the following regression: 
 εσβσβασ +++= IHyearinduD 21, , (1) 
Where, the dependent variable, σD, is the disclosed stock-price volatility parameter used by the 
firm in calculating the option expense, αindu,year is an industry-year fixed effect, σH is historical 
volatility, and σI is implied volatility. 
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Conceptually, in an efficient capital market implied volatility should perform better than 
historical volatility in predicting future stock price volatility because it is derived from option 
prices which reflect both historical and forward-looking information.  However, because 
investors do not necessarily use the black-Scholes model in setting option prices, implied 
volatility (which is derived by equating the black-Scholes formula with the observed option 
price) may measure market expectations of future volatility with error.  In fact, while research in 
finance generally finds that implied volatility is better than historical volatility in forecasting 
future volatility, they also find that both measures contain incremental information relative to 
each other (e.g., Mayhew 1995).  In the context of ESO, the advantage of implied volatility over 
historical volatility may be smaller because the maturity of these options is considerably longer 
than that of traded options (from which implied volatility is derived).  Still, implied volatility 
reflects both historical and forward-looking information relevant for the prediction of future 
stock-price volatility.  Consequently, the incremental relationship between disclosed and implied 
volatilities, after controlling for historical volatility, should indicate the extent to which disclosed 
volatility contains forward-looking expected volatility information.  Thus, if firms incorporate 
both historical and forward-looking information in estimating the expected volatility parameter, 
then (H1): 1 > 0 and 2 > 0.  In contrast, if they use only historical volatility, then (H2): 1 = 1 
and 2 = 0.  In addition, the relative magnitudes of 1 and 2 indicate the extent to which firms 
adjust historical volatility to reflect forward-looking information when deriving the expected 
volatility parameter.2 
To test our second research question of whether firms incorporate forward-looking 
information opportunistically to decrease expected volatility and thus the option expense, we 
                                                 
2
 An alternative explanation is that differences in the level of measurement error between σH and σI account for 
differences in 1 and 2.  We assess empirically the validity of this alternative explanation below. 
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estimate the following model: 
εσβσββσβσβασ +×+×++++= IHIHyearinduD IMPHIIMPHIIMPHI ___ 54321, , (2) 
Where, HI_IMP is an indicator variable that equals one when σI > σH (i.e., when forward-
looking information indicates larger expected volatility than historical information), and the 
other variables are defined as before.  In terms of Equation (2), opportunistic managerial 
behavior implies (H3): β4 > 0 and β5 < 0.  A negative β5 means that the weight on forward-
looking information decreases when reliance on forward-looking information leads to higher 
disclosed volatility and thus larger option expense.  An extreme version of opportunism, in 
which managers rely on forward-looking information solely to reduce disclosed volatility, 
predicts β2 + β5 = 0; that is, if implied volatility is larger than historical volatility, implied 
volatility has no effect on disclosed volatility and thus on the option expense.  Finally, we 
observe that if firms rely primarily on historical and implied volatilities in determining disclosed 
volatility, the sum of the weights on these two variables should be approximately one.  This 
implies that less weight on implied volatility (i.e., negative β5) should translate into more weight 
on historical volatility (i.e., positive β4). 
 We next refine hypothesis H3 by considering the relation between managerial incentives 
to understate the expected volatility assumption and the opportunistic use of forward-looking 
volatility information.  If corporate executives use forward-looking information to reduce 
expected volatility particularly when their incentives to report low option expense are strong, 
then (H4): 4 (5) will be increasing (decreasing) in a firm’s incentives to understate the option 
expense.  To investigate H4, we partition the sample based on proxies for management’s 
incentives to understate the option expense, estimate Equation (2) for each subsample, and test 
for differences between the two subsamples. 
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We measure management’s incentives to understate the option expense using two 
proxies: option holdings by top executives and the industry’s ESO granting intensity.  The first 
variable is measured as the ratio of the number of options held by the top five executives divided 
by the number of shares outstanding.  When using this incentives proxy, firm-year observations 
are classified as having strong (weak) incentives to understate the option expense if their option 
ratio is above (below) the sample median for that year.  Managers may also be concerned about 
the perceived value of all ESO grants, as it represents potential dilution for existing shareholders.  
To capture this aspect of managerial incentives, we partition the sample to industries where 
ESOs are relatively immaterial, compared with industries where options play an important role.  
Based on the evidence in Huson et al. (2001, p. 597, Table 1), we identify the sample firms from 
industries with SIC codes 30–39 (industrial manufacturing) and 70–89 (services) as having a 
potentially large option granting intensity, and all other sample firms as less likely to have 
significant option grants.3 
 
3. Data and Variable Definitions 
To perform our primary tests, we need to collect data on the three volatility measures 
(disclosed, historical, and implied), option holdings of executives, shares outstanding, and 
industry membership.  To evaluate alternative interpretations of our results, we also require a 
measure of realized future volatility, that is, stock price volatility in a period subsequent to the 
options grant date.  We next describe how we obtain each of these variables. 
Companies disclose information about option grants to employees in the annual report, in 
Form 10-K, and in the proxy statement.  The 10-K and annual report disclosures are prepared 
                                                 
3
 Huson at el. (2001) estimate option granting intensity using the ratio of shares reserved for conversion to the total 
of shares reserved for conversion and outstanding shares.  Unfortunately, information on shares reserved for 
conversion is not available after 1996, the first year of our sample period. 
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according to SFAS No. 123 and thus cover all option grants, with value estimates typically based 
on the Black-Scholes methodology.  In contrast, proxy statements, issued in connection with 
shareholder meetings and governed by SEC regulation, contain information about option grants 
only to the five highest-paid executives, with value estimates based on either a formal option 
pricing methodology or on simple metrics reflecting the potential realizable value of the options 
assuming 5 percent or 10 percent annual rates of stock price appreciation.  One important 
difference between the two approaches is that the former incorporates stock-price volatility while 
the latter does not.  Yermack (1998) reports that essentially all firms that select a formal option 
pricing methodology use some variant of the Black-Scholes formula.  We hand-collect the stock-
price volatility assumption from Form 10-K because this source is easily accessible through the 
SEC’s Electronic Data Gathering, Analysis, and Retrieval (EDGAR) database.4 
The other variables required for our tests are obtained from two machine-readable data 
sources, Execucomp and Optionmetrics.  Execucomp collects information from proxy statements 
about the compensation of the company’s five most highly paid executives, and also calculates 
and reports statistics useful for interpreting this information (e.g., historical volatility).  This data 
source covers a large set of firms, primarily members of the S&P 1500 (currently 2,513 distinct 
firms and 23,171 executives over the period 1992-2002). 
We retrieve from Execucomp a measure of historical volatility (BS_VOLATILITY), 
which Execucomp computes using monthly returns from the previous 60 months.  We also 
retrieve from Execucomp the required data for calculating one of our two incentives proxies, the 
                                                 
4
 To maximize sample size, in cases where disclosed volatility was unavailable from the 10-K but available from the 
proxy statement, we use information from the latter source.  This adds 68 firm-years (corresponding to 22 distinct 
firms) to our sample.  As discussed below, examination of a subsample with disclosed volatilities in both the 10-K 
and proxy statement indicates that the two estimates are essentially identical, so our choice to use proxy statement 
information as a substitute for missing 10-K information is not likely to introduce bias.  Indeed, we obtain similar 
results to those reported when omitting the 68 proxy statement observations.  
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magnitude of executive option holdings.  This variable is measured as the average number of 
options held by executives (average of the total of UEXNUMEX and UEXNUMUN for the firm-
year), divided by the number of shares outstanding (SHRSOUT).5  In addition, we retrieve from 
Execucomp an indicator variable called PCDCOMP, which provides information about the 
methodology used to value ESOs, a formal option pricing model or a simple metric assuming 5% 
or 10% annual stock return. 
Optionmetrics provides data about implied volatilities derived from the prices of put and 
call options with different maturities and strike prices, for each business day during the period 
January 1996 through February 2003.  We focus on the implied volatilities of near-the-money 
options and derive a unique measure of implied volatility for each firm-year observation using 
the following procedure.  First, for each firm-year and each strike price, we obtain the implied 
volatilities of the call and put options with the longest maturity as of July 1st of that year.  For 
each type of options (call and put), we then identify the options with the strike price closest to 
the prevailing stock price on each side.  If an exact match is found, we use that option to measure 
the implied volatility of the corresponding type (call or put).  If not, we extrapolate from the 
implied volatilities of the two options, assigning weights that are inversely proportional to the 
distance between the stock price and the exercise price.  For example, if the stock price is $42 
and the two nearest call options have exercise prices of $40 and $45 and implied volatilities of 
0.34 and 0.36, respectively, then we estimate the implied volatility of call options as: 
348.0)3/1()2/1(
36.0*)3/1(34.0*)2/1(
=
+
+
.  If all strike prices are on one side of the prevailing stock 
                                                 
5
 We use the average rather than sum because the number of executives for each firm-year is not always five.  For 
about 10 percent of the observations, the number of executives is less than five and for about one quarter, there are 
more than five executives per firm-year.  The average number of top executives for our sample is actually 5.2. 
 11 
price, we use the implied volatility of the option with the nearest strike price.  Finally, we 
calculate the average of the call and put implied volatilities.  
 The rationale for these choices is as follows.  We extract data as of July 1 (mid-year) 
because option grants occur throughout the year (for the same reason, Execucomp measures 
historical volatility on July 1).  We focus on the implied volatilities of near-the-money options 
because prior research has demonstrated that these volatilities perform better in predicting future 
volatility than those of deep in- or out-of-the-money options (see, e.g., Mayhew 1995, Hull 
2000).  We calculate the average of call and put implied volatilities to mitigate any measurement 
error induced by the Black-Scholes assumptions underlying the calculation of implied volatility.  
We focus on options with the longest maturities because employee stock options have very long 
maturities (approximately 5 year on average according to Aboody et al. 2003), and empirically 
implied volatilities vary by time-to-maturity, generally showing a declining trend.6 
 Finally, we calculate realized (future) volatility using monthly stock returns from July of 
the reporting year (year t) through June of year t+5.  The choice of a five-year period is 
consistent with expected ESO lives as reported by companies (e.g., Aboody et al. 2003) as well 
as with the calculation of historical volatility by Execucomp.  However, for most of our firm-
year observations, fewer than 60 monthly returns are available.  Specifically, because CRSP 
return data are currently available through December 2002, the maximum number of monthly 
stock returns is 18 for fiscal year 2001 (July 2001 through December 2002), 30 for fiscal year 
2000, 42 for fiscal year 1999, and 54 for fiscal year 1998.  In addition, some firms delist before 
the end of the five-year period (or December 2002).  To avoid survivorship bias, we calculate 
realized volatility in all cases, utilizing all available observations (including delisting returns). 
                                                 
6
 Indeed, our success in matching on time-to-maturity is only partial.  The mean (median) time-to-maturity of our 
traded options is 347 (205) calendar days. 
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Our sample period covers six years, 1996-2001.  The sample period commences in 1996 
because (1) implied volatilities are available from Optionmetrics only since January 1996, and 
(2) SFAS No. 123 is effective as of fiscal year 1996.  The sample period ends in 2001 because 
Execucomp’s data collection for 2002 is incomplete at the time we retrieved the data; the number 
of observations available on Execucomp for this year is only about one-third of the average 
number of annual observations during 1996 through 2001. 
Panel A of Table 1 presents the effect of each sample selection criterion on our final 
sample size.  There are 15,078 firm-year observations in Execucomp for our sample period, 
corresponding to 2,513 distinct firms.  However, many of these observations belong to firms that 
do not use formal option pricing methodologies in valuing executive option grants in the proxy 
statement.  To increase the power of our tests, we focus on firms using a formal option pricing 
methodology in the proxy statement.  For this subset, the volatility assumption affects both the 
proxy statement and the 10-K disclosures, strengthening management’s incentives to understate 
expected volatility. 7   Although both SFAS No. 123 governing 10-Ks and SEC regulation 
governing proxy statements allow for substantial discretion in measuring volatility, empirically 
firms use nearly identical volatility assumptions in calculating the value of option grants in the 
Form 10-K and proxy statement.8  Restricting the sample to firms that use a formal option 
                                                 
7
 Yermack (1998) reports that after selecting a method firms rarely switch to another.  Because proxy statement 
disclosure of the value of options granted to executives is required since 1992, the choice of option pricing 
methodology is essentially exogenous for our sample, which covers the period 1996 through 2001. 
 
8
 We compared the volatility assumption in the proxy statement with that in the 10-K for a small sample of firms and 
found that the two parameters are essentially identical.  Specifically, we randomly selected 50 firm-year 
observations from our sample (discussed below) and were able to obtain proxy statements for 43 of these 
observations.  Seven of these firms did not disclose the volatility parameter in the proxy statement.  For the 
remaining 36 firm-years that did disclose the volatility assumption, the proxy statement volatility is nearly identical 
to the 10-K volatility.  The mean proxy statement (10-K) volatility is 0.365 (0.366), the Pearson correlation between 
the two parameters is 0.983, and the Spearman correlation is 0.969.   
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pricing methodology in the proxy statement leaves us with 2,765 observations (753 firms).9   
The remaining selection criteria are as follows.  Six observations with zero option grants 
to executives are omitted, because management incentives to understate option value may be 
weaker for these firms.  This leaves us with 2,759 observations representing 751 distinct firms.  
However, implied volatilities are unavailable from Optionmetrics for 660 firm-years, reducing 
our sample to 2,099 firm-years (575 firms).  For 77 observations, we were unable to find the 
disclosed volatility information in the 10-K and proxy statement, and 19 observations had no 
future returns in CRSP.  Thus, there are 1,993 firm-year observations (548 distinct firms) with all 
the required data.  However, two of these observations are obvious multivariate outliers:  They 
each have χ2 value (a measure of the standardized distance from the other observations, see 
Watson 1990) that is at least 25 percent larger than that of any other observation, while none of 
the other observations has a χ2 that is more than 10 percent larger than the next highest χ2.10  We 
therefore delete these two observations.  Our final sample consists of 1,991 observations (547 
firms). 
 The remaining panels of Table 1 outline characteristics of our sample firms (Panel B), as 
well as the time (Panel C) and industry (Panel D) distributions of the observations.  As evident 
from the results displayed in Panel B, the sample includes primarily, albeit not exclusively, large, 
profitable firms, consistent with the focus of Execucomp and Optionmetrics on such firms.  
Panel C shows that the number of observations is distributed relatively evenly over time, ranging 
from 283 observations in 1996 to 385 observations in 1999, and Panel D demonstrates there is 
little evidence of industry clustering within our sample. 
                                                 
9
 Execucomp has an indicator variable called PCDCOMP, which identifies the methodology used. 
10
 Following Watson (1990), we detect multivariate outlier observations using the statistic =2iχ  
)m(mS)mm( i-1i −′− , where i denotes the ith observation; bar denotes average over all sample firms; m is the 4×1 
vector of volatilities (historical, implied, disclosed and realized); and S is the 4×4 sample covariance matrix of m.  
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 Table 2 presents distribution statistics for the primary variables used in our tests below: 
disclosed volatility (σD), historical volatility (σH), implied volatility (σI), and realized volatility 
(σR).  The statistics in Panel A, which covers the full sample, show substantial variation in each 
of the four volatility measures.  They also show that the distributions of σD, σH, and σI are quite 
similar.  Still, relative to σH (mean = 0.347, median = 0.318), the distribution of σD (mean = 
0.341, median = 0.309) is slightly shifted to left, while that of σI (mean = 0.375, median = 0.344) 
is shifted to the right.  In contrast, the distribution of σR (mean = 0.432, median = 0.372) is 
substantially shifted to the right and is flatter than those of the other three volatility measures 
(standard deviation of 0.223 compared to 0.145-0.151 for the other three volatility measures).  
The mean forecast error of disclosed volatility (i.e., σR – σD) is 0.091, which is both 
economically and statistically significant (26.7 percent of average disclosed volatility, t-statistic 
of 20.0).  While a plausible explanation for this result is that firms opportunistically understate 
expected volatility to reduce option expense, an alternative explanation is that the high average 
forecast error volatility is period-specific.  During our sample period, many firms experienced 
unusual levels of stock price variability (see, e.g., Liu et al. 2003), which most likely have not 
been fully anticipated. 
 The remaining panels of Table 2 present distribution statistics for two subsamples: firm-
years with σI > σH (Panel B), and those with σI < σH (Panel C).  Unlike in Panel A, the 
distributions of σI and σH in panels B and C are quite different from each other (by construction), 
which facilitate more informative comparisons with disclosed volatility.  When σI > σH (Panel 
B), the distribution of σD (mean = 0.324, median = 0.295) is similar to that of σH (mean = 0.314, 
median = 0.288) but is quite different from that of σI (mean = 0.388, median = 0.355).  These 
results suggest that firms ignore forward looking information when it implies high volatility and 
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hence large option expense.  Conversely, when σI < σH (Panel C), firms use a hybrid of σH and 
σI and report σD (mean = 0.374, median = 0.350) which is substantially smaller than σH (mean = 
0.413, median = 0.382) but is larger than σI (mean = 0.347, median = 0.327).  These findings 
provide prima-facie evidence that firms estimate expected volatility opportunistically, as they 
incorporate forward looking information only when doing so results in a smaller option expense.  
We formally investigate this issue in the next section. 
 Table 3 presents the time-series means of pair-wise cross sectional correlations for the 
primary variables used in our empirical analyses.  As shown, the correlations between all four 
volatility measures are very high, although those involving realized volatility are considerably 
smaller.  The high correlation between σI and σH is expected because historical volatility is a 
primary source of information for predicting future volatility (e.g., Alford and Boatsman 1995).  
Although σD is highly correlated with both historical and implied volatilities, its correlation with 
implied volatility is smaller.  This could be due to measurement error in implied volatility, or to 
firms’ failure to incorporate forward-looking information.  It could also be due to strategic 
reporting by firms.  We next turn to the regression analysis, which allows us to examine these 
possibilities. 
 
4. Empirical Results 
4.1 DO FIRMS INCORPORATE FORWARD-LOOKING INFORMATION IN ESTIMATING EXPECTED 
VOLATILITY? 
 
 Table 4 presents the estimation results of Equation (1) for pooled data and for each of our 
six sample years separately.  In the pooled regression, and in each of the six annual regressions, 
the coefficients on historical volatility (ranging from 0.4511 to 0.7069) and on implied volatility 
(ranging from 0.1867 to 0.4470) are both positive and highly significant.  Moreover, in all 
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regressions the sum of 1 and 2 is close to 1, indicating that σI and σH are the primary 
determinants of σD.  Collectively these findings are consistent with H1 and the guidance in SFAS 
No. 123, suggesting that firms rely on both historical and forward-looking information in 
determining the expected volatility parameter used in the calculation of the option expense.  The 
findings are inconsistent with hypothesis H2 that only historical information is used in deriving 
σD.  Finally, we note that the stability of our results across sample years indicates that a potential 
mulicolinearity problem due to high correlations among the independent variables is not serious. 
 
4.2 DO FIRMS USE FORWARD-LOOKING VOLATILITY INFORMATION OPPORTUNISTICALLY? 
 In this section we test hypotheses H3 and H4 by estimating Equation (2) for the full 
sample, as well as for subsamples partitioned based on proxies for managerial incentives to 
understate the option expense.  Table 5 presents the results for the full sample, and Table 6 
presents the partitioned-sample results.  Recall that Equation (2) is derived from Equation (1) by 
allowing the intercept and the slope coefficients to depend on whether implied volatility is above 
(HI_IMP = 1) or below (HI_IMP = 0) historical volatility.  Thus, when implied volatility is 
smaller than historical volatility, the coefficient on historical volatility is equal to β1 and the 
coefficient on implied volatility is equal to β2.  However, when implied volatility is larger than 
historical volatility, the coefficient on historical volatility is equal to 1 + 4 and the coefficient 
on implied volatility is equal to 2 + 5. 
The results for the full sample (Table 5) reveal that when implied volatility is lower 
(higher) than historical volatility, firms rely heavily on forward-looking (historical) information.  
Considering the pooled regression results first, when implied volatility is smaller than historical 
volatility, 2, the coefficient on implied volatility (0.7079), is more than twice as large as 1, the 
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coefficient on historical volatility (0.2679).  In contrast, when implied volatility is larger than 
historical volatility, 2 + 5, the coefficient on implied volatility, declines by approximately 85 
percent (from 0.7079 to 0.1170) and turns statistically insignificant.  Correspondingly, 1 + 4, 
the coefficient on historical volatility, increases dramatically from 0.2679 to 0.8682, and 
becomes insignificantly different from one.  That is, when forward-looking information implies 
high future volatility, firms seem to ignore this information and instead rely exclusively on 
historical volatility in estimating future volatility.  Accordingly, consistent with H3, 4, the 
coefficient measuring the differential weights on historical volatility when implied volatility is 
high, is positive (0.6004) and highly significant (t-statistic = 8.39), and 5, the coefficient 
measuring the differential weights on implied volatility, is negative (-0.5909) and highly 
significant (t-statistic = -7.49). 
 Examination of the six annual regressions indicates that the inferences from the pooled 
regression are robust.  For example, the coefficient on implied volatility when it is higher than 
historical volatility (2 + 5) is insignificant in each of the six years, and each of the coefficients 
that measure the differential weights, 4 and 5, has the same sign in each of the six years and is 
significant in most of the years.  Moreover, there is no apparent time trend in any of the 
coefficients, suggesting that our results are unlikely to be period specific. 
 One way to interpret the findings thus far is that managers generally use the readily 
available historical volatility to estimate expected volatility, unless they have a reason to use 
forward-looking information.  That reason, however, is not to improve on the measurement of 
expected volatility; rather firms use forward looking information opportunistically to lower 
expected volatility and thus option expense. 
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Does this opportunistic behavior relate to managerial incentives to understate the option 
expense?  According to H4, corporate executives with strong incentives to understate option 
expense are more likely to incorporate forward-looking information that indicates low volatility 
than executives with weak incentives.  To test this hypothesis, we partition the sample on the 
basis of two alternative proxies for managerial incentives: (1) the relative magnitude of option 
holdings by executives, and (2) the option granting intensity, as measured by industry 
membership.  Table 6 presents the results.  The table contains six columns; the three leftmost 
columns correspond to the sample partition based on executive option holdings, and the three 
rightmost columns relate to the sample partition based on the firm’s option granting intensity.  
For each of the two alternative partitions, we report estimates of equation (2) for the weak and 
strong incentive subsamples separately, followed in the third column by the differences in 
coefficients between the two regressions (labeled “High – Low”). 
In all four cases (“low option holdings,” “high option holdings,” “low option granting 
intensity,” and “high option granting intensity”), when implied volatility is larger than historical 
volatility, the weight on historical volatility (1 + 4) is close to one while the weight on implied 
volatility (2 + 5) is close to zero and statistically insignificant.  In addition, differences in these 
coefficients between firms with strong and weak incentives to understate option expense, 
displayed in the “High – Low” columns, are insignificants for both partitions.  That is, when the 
use of implied volatility would lead to a larger option expense, firms ignore this information and 
rely exclusively on the readily available historical volatility, independent of their incentives to 
understate the option expense.  In other words, incentives to understate option expense play little 
role in estimating expected volatility when implied volatility is larger than historical volatility. 
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In contrast, when implied volatility is smaller than historical volatility, incentives to 
understate option expense play an important role in estimating expected volatility.  In particular, 
when managerial incentives are strong, firms rely primarily on implied volatilities (2 > 1 in 
both partitions), but when managerial incentives are weak, firms only partially incorporate 
forward-looking information (1 < 2 in both partitions).  This effect of managerial incentives on 
the propensity to incorporate forward-looking information, which leads to low expected 
volatility, is economically important and statistically significant for both partitions.  Specifically, 
for the partition based on executive option holdings the difference in 1 between the strong and 
weak incentives subsamples is –0.3583 with t-statistic = –2.13, and the difference in 2 is 0.4894 
with t-statistic = 2.45.  Similarly, for the partition based on option granting intensity the 
difference in 1 between the strong and weak incentives subsamples is –0.5542 with t-statistic = 
–5.07, and the difference in 2 is 0.5234 with t-statistic = 3.60.   
Overall, the picture that emerges from our findings is that firms use the readily available 
historical volatility as the default value in estimating expected volatility, and incorporate 
forward-looking information only when doing so reduces the pro-forma option expense.  In such 
cases, firms with strong incentives to understate the option expense rely almost exclusively on 
forward-looking information, while those with weak incentives only partially incorporate it.  
Why do not all firms fully adjust for forward-looking information when it leads to a smaller 
option expense?  A plausible explanation is that incorporating forward-looking information in 
estimating expected volatility is costly, because, among other things, it requires management to 
justify the departure from historical volatility to its auditors, board of directors, and possibly to 
users of the financial statements.  Our results suggest that the benefit of incorporating forward-
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looking information exceeds this cost mostly for firms with strong incentives to understate the 
option expense. 
 
4.3 REALIZED VOLATILITY 
Thus far we have focused on the relation between implied and historical volatility in 
testing whether firms manage the disclosed volatility parameter.  We next use realized future 
volatility as a proxy for expected volatility and conduct supplementary tests which examine: (1) 
whether measurement error in implied and/or historical volatility provide an alternative 
explanation for our findings, and (2) the extent to which historical and implied volatilities can be 
used to identify the downward bias in disclosed volatility. 
It is arguable that the results reported in Table 5 and Table 6, indicating that disclosed 
volatility is related to implied volatility primarily when σI < σH, are due to the relative 
magnitudes of measurement error in implied and historical volatility rather than to management 
of disclosed volatility.  More specifically, it is possible that a relatively high volatility value is 
associated with a relatively high magnitude of measurement error, which makes the volatility 
number relatively less informative.  If so, when σI < σH (σI > σH) firms appropriately rely less on 
σH (σI) and more on σI (σH) in deriving σD, as this will lead to a more accurate expected 
volatility estimate. 
To assess the validity of this alternative interpretation for our findings, we compare the 
accuracy of σI and σH in predicting σR for two subsamples: one consists of firms with σI  σH 
and the other of firms with σI > σH.  For the alternative interpretation to be valid, the predictive 
accuracy of σH should be lower than that of σI when σI < σH and higher when σI > σH.  Panels A 
and B of Table 7 presents the results of these comparisons.  Using two alternative measures for 
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predictive accuracy, mean squared errors (Panel A) and mean absolute errors (Panel B), we find 
that the predictive accuracy of σH is not worse than that of σI for the subsample with σI < σH and 
not better than σI for the subsample with σI  σH.  For example, for the subsample with σI > σH, 
the mean of |σR-σI| is lower, not higher, than that of |σR-σH| (0.1276 compared to 0.1322), and 
for the subsample with σI  σH, the mean of |σR-σI| is higher, not lower, than that of |σR-σH| 
(0.1641 compared to 0.1544).  We thus conclude that the measurement errors story cannot 
explain our results in Tables 5 and 6. 
Given our findings that firms exploit the flexibility allowed by FASB 123 to 
opportunistically incorporate historical and forward-looking information in estimating expected 
volatility, a natural question that arises is whether historical volatility and/or implied volatility 
can be used to identify ex-ante cases where disclosed volatility is understated.  One way to gain 
insights into this intriguing question is to run three regressions nested in the following model: 
 εββασσ +++=− IMPHIHISTHIyearinduDR __ 21,  (3) 
Where σR and σH are as before, and HI_HIST (HI_IMP) is an indicator variable equal to one if 
historical (implied) volatility is greater than disclosed volatility.  (Note that, unlike the previous 
regressions, here HI_IMP is defined relative to disclosed volatility, not historical volatility.) 
 Table 8 presents the results of these regression analyses.  The estimates for Model 1 
indicate that when disclosed volatility is lower than historical volatility, realized volatility is on 
average larger than disclosed volatility by 8.47 percent.  The results for Model 2 suggest that 
when disclosed volatility is smaller than implied volatility, realized volatility is larger than 
disclosed volatility by 6.91 percent.  The information in historical and implied volatilities is 
largely orthogonal; when disclosed volatility is smaller than both historical and implied 
volatilities (Model 3), it turns out to be smaller than realized volatility by 11.81 percent (7.22 + 
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4.59).  Given that the mean value of disclosed volatility is 34.1 percent, this predictable bias is 
clearly nontrivial. 
 
4.4 SENSITIVITY TESTS 
Finally, we perform three types of sensitivity tests.  First, to consider a possible bias that 
may result from the skewness of implied, historical, and disclosed volatilities, we rerun the 
analysis measuring all volatilities in logarithm form.  Second, because we measure volatilities at 
the same calendar time (July 1) for all firms, the inclusion of firms with non-December fiscal 
year-end may introduce bias.  To assess this possibility, we rerun the analyses after excluding 
non-December fiscal year-end firms.  Third, in the primary analysis we extrapolate the implied 
volatilities of at the money options from options whose strike prices are around the stock price.  
When the strike prices of those options are not close enough to the stock price, significant 
measurement error may result.  We therefore rerun the analysis excluding observations where the 
nearest strike price is more than five percent of the current stock price. 
Table 9 displays the results of these sensitivity tests.  Specifically, the three leftmost 
columns of Table 6 are replicated: (1) using logarithm form for the volatility variables rather 
their actual values (results in the three leftmost columns of Table 9), (2) excluding non-
December fiscal year end firms (results in the middle three columns of Table 9), and (3) 
excluding strike prices more than 5 percent of stock price (results in the three right-most columns 
of Table 9).  A comparison of the results indicates that the signs, magnitudes, and significance 
levels of all variables are robust to the alternative research-design choices. 
Finally, the use of implied volatility involves at least five choices: the option’s time-to-
maturity, strike price, type (a call or a put), measurement date, and aggregation.  In the primary 
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analysis above, we selected to measure implied volatility as of July 1 of each year, and focus on 
the average value of call and put options that are near-the-money and have the longest maturity.  
Due to the important role of implied volatility in this study, and the many choices involved in its 
measurement, it is important to check the sensitivity of the results to alternative measurement 
procedures.  We thus rerun the analysis using the following alternative procedures in measuring 
implied volatility: (1) deriving implied volatilities from either call or put options (instead of 
using the average), (2) measuring implied volatilities as of December 31 of each year instead of 
July 1, (3) using options with the same time to maturity (instead of the longest maturity 
available), and (4) using the mean or median of all implied volatilities available in 
Optionmetrics.  In each of these cases, the results (not reported for parsimony) are similar to 
those reported.  This further mitigates concerns regarding potential bias from any systematic 
measurement error in implied volatility. 
 
5. Conclusion and Discussion 
 To measure the value of ESO, firms are required to first derive an estimate for expected 
stock-price volatility.  This input parameter has two characteristics:  It is highly discretionary, 
and it has a large effect on the estimated value of ESO.  Together, these two characteristics imply 
that if firms manipulate the option expense, they are likely to do so by managing the expected 
volatility parameter.  Yet, previous studies that examine the disclosed stock-price volatility 
assumption fail to document such behavior.  This result is surprising particularly because other 
tests (e.g., examining option expected lives) do indicate that firms manage assumptions 
underlying the calculation of the option expense. 
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 Using a new methodology, we address two questions:  (1) Do firms follow the guidance 
in SFAS No. 123 and use both historical and forward looking information in estimating expected 
volatility?  And (2) what are the determinants underlying the cross-sectional variation in firms’ 
tendency to incorporate forward looking information into their expected volatility assumption?  
We find that managers use both historical and forward-looking information in determining the 
expected volatility parameter, which is consistent with the literal guidance in SFAS No. 123.  We 
also find, however, that the reliance on forward-looking information is limited to situations 
where it results in reduced expected volatility and thus smaller option expense.  One way to 
interpret this finding is that managers use opportunistically the discretion with respect to 
estimating expected volatility afforded by SFAS No. 123.  In support of this interpretation, we 
also find that managerial incentives play a key role in this opportunism.  Managers exploit the 
discretion in estimating volatility primarily when their option holdings or the firm’s option 
granting intensity are relatively large. 
 As a proxy for forward-looking volatility information, we use estimates of implied 
volatilities inferred from the prices of traded call options.  Thus, our evidence regarding the 
opportunistic use of this information by firms suggests that auditors, investors, and other users of 
financial statements may utilize implied volatilities as a benchmark in evaluating the 
appropriateness of the expected volatility parameter.  Nowadays, this recommendation is rather 
easy to implement, given that information on implied volatilities is obtainable from independent 
sources in a timely and inexpensive manner (e.g., http://www.ivolatility.com). 
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TABLE 1 
Sample 
  
Panel A: Sample selection 
 Firm- 
Years 
Distinct 
Firms 
Compensation data available on Execucomp from 1996-2001 15,078 2,513 
LESS Firms not using formal option pricing in proxy statement 12,313 1,760 
Firms that use formal option pricing in proxy statement 2,765 753 
LESS Firms with zero executive option grants           6        2 
Firms with non-zero executive option grants 2,759 751 
LESS Option information unavailable on Optionmetrics      660    176 
Both compensation and option information available 2,099 575 
LESS Missing disclosed volatility in both 10-K and proxy statement         77        17 
Both disclosed and implied volatility available 2,022 558 
LESS Unavailable CRSP returns to calculate realized volatility          19        10 
Disclosed, implied volatility and realized volatility are all available 1,993 548 
LESS Deletion of outliers          2        1 
FINAL SAMPLE 1,991 547 
 
Panel B: Descriptive statistics for sample firm-years 
 
 Mean Std. Dev. P5 Q1 Median Q3 P95 
Sales ($millions) 8,386 18,198 297 1,235 3,017 8,518 30,147 
Assets 24,141 76,493 349 1,641 4,616 15,223 93,179 
Book value of equity 3,449 6,792 137 530 1,327 3,478 14,473 
Market value of equity  11,627 24,634 337 1,303 3,546 9,552 54,538 
Book-to-market 0.484 0.499 0.068 0.234 0.406 0.612 1.117 
Return on assets 4.0% 9.1% -4.5% 1.1% 3.5% 7.4% 15.0% 
Sales growth 14.4% 47.6% -20.0% -0.1% 7.5% 19.4% 62.2% 
 
Panel C: Time Distribution 
   
Year Firm-Years % 
1996 283 14.2% 
1997 313 15.7% 
1998 350 17.6% 
1999 385 19.3% 
2000 330 16.6% 
2001 330 16.6% 
TOTAL 1,991 100.0% 
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Panel D: Industry distribution 
 
SIC CODE 
 
DESCRIPTION 
Firm-
Years 
 
% 
13 Oil and gas extraction 82 4.1% 
20 Food and kindred products 43 2.2% 
26 Paper and allied products 56 2.8% 
27 Printing and publishing 56 2.8% 
28 Chemicals and allied products 134 6.7% 
29 Petroleum and coal products 32 1.6% 
33 Primary metal industries 30 1.5% 
34 Fabricated metal products 39 2.0% 
35 Industrial machinery and equipment 100 5.0% 
36 Electronic & other electric equipment 55 2.8% 
37 Transportation equipment 77 3.9% 
38 Instruments and related products 81 4.1% 
40 Railroad transportation 24 1.2% 
45 Transportation by air 26 1.3% 
48 Communication 83 4.2% 
49 Electric, gas, and sanitary services 158 7.9% 
50 Wholesale trade-durable goods 30 1.5% 
51 Wholesale trade-nondurable goods 48 2.4% 
53 General merchandise stores 22 1.1% 
56 Apparel and accessory stores 26 1.3% 
59 Miscellaneous retail 46 2.3% 
60 Depository institutions 165 8.3% 
61 Non-Depository institutions 44 2.2% 
62 Security and commodity brokers 41 2.1% 
63 Insurance carriers 95 4.8% 
73 Business services 100 5.0% 
80 Health services 33 1.7% 
 ALL OTHER INDUSTRIES 265 13.3% 
 TOTAL 1,991 100.0% 
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TABLE 2 
Summary Statistics 
 
Panel A: Statistics from the pooled time-series cross-section distributions (1,991 
observations) 
 
 Mean Std. Dev. P5 Q1 Median Q3 P95 
σD 0.341 0.148 0.173 0.240 0.309 0.400 0.626 
σH 0.347 0.145 0.176 0.239 0.318 0.411 0.633 
σI 0.375 0.151 0.199 0.271 0.344 0.440 0.657 
σI – σH 0.028 0.100 -0.118 -0.019 0.029 0.074 0.174 
σR 0.432 0.223 0.212 0.297 0.372 0.496 0.858 
σR – σD 0.091 0.203 -0.147 -0.019 0.072 0.160 0.429 
 
Panel B: Statistics for sub-sample with σI > σH (1,327 observations out of 1,991) 
 
 Mean Std. Dev. P5 Q1 Median Q3 P95 
σD 0.324 0.141 0.170 0.230 0.295 0.373 0.600 
σH 0.314 0.125 0.171 0.225 0.288 0.368 0.554 
σI 0.388 0.161 0.211 0.274 0.356 0.458 0.703 
σI – σH 0.074 0.076 0.006 0.029 0.055 0.097 0.203 
σR 0.413 0.206 0.219 0.295 0.356 0.468 0.794 
σR – σD 0.089 0.186 -0.132 -0.005 0.072 0.151 0.352 
 
Panel C: Statistics for sub-sample with σI <= σH (664 observations out of 1,991) 
 
 Mean Std. Dev. P5 Q1 Median Q3 P95 
σD 0.374 0.155 0.188 0.270 0.350 0.447 0.670 
σH 0.413 0.160 0.201 0.306 0.382 0.491 0.748 
σI 0.347 0.125 0.179 0.258 0.327 0.413 0.588 
σI – σH -0.065 0.076 -0.195 -0.088 -0.042 -0.019 -0.003 
σR 0.469 0.251 0.196 0.303 0.418 0.559 0.924 
σR – σD 0.095 0.234 -0.183 -0.051 0.069 0.188 0.479 
 
σD is the volatility used by the firm in calculating the value of option grants, disclosed in Form 
10-K.  σH is historical stock-price volatility.  σI is implied volatility, calculated using the prices 
of traded call and put options. σR is the realized volatility, calculated using monthly stock 
returns.   
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TABLE 3 
Time-series Means (over the Sample Years) of Cross-sectional Correlation Coefficients; Pearson 
(Spearman) Correlations are below (above) the Main Diagonal 
 σD σH σI σI – σH σR σR – σD 
σD 1.000 0.823 0.745 -0.129 0.599 -0.202 
σH 0.797 1.000 0.807 -0.301 0.667 0.016 
σI 0.731 0.757 1.000 0.230 0.593 -0.005 
σI – σH -0.070 -0.322 0.367 1.000 -0.129 -0.049 
σR 0.514 0.587 0.497 -0.112 1.000 0.584 
σR – σD -0.130 0.099 0.043 -0.080 0.782 1.000 
 
The number of observations is 1,991 (547 distinct firms).  σD is the volatility used by the firm in 
calculating the value of option grants, disclosed in Form 10-K.  σH is historical stock-price 
volatility.  σI is implied volatility, calculated using the prices of traded call and put options. σR is 
the realized volatility, calculated using monthly stock returns.   
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TABLE 4 
Regressions Examining the Extent to which Firms Incorporate Forward-Looking Information in 
Estimating Expected Volatility 
 
εσβσβασ +++= IHyearinduD 21,  
 
 Pooled 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
1 0.6088 0.6763 0.5791 0.6153 0.4511 0.7069 0.5673 
t(1) 22.18 10.29 9.14 9.85 7.33 9.42 7.90 
        
2 0.2882 0.1867 0.3887 0.2447 0.3622 0.1839 0.4470 
t(2) 11.20 3.27 5.71 4.31 6.21 2.90 6.16 
        
Adj. R2 73.99% 63.79% 77.87% 67.44% 67.97% 66.46% 78.99% 
        
N 1,991 283 313 350 385 330 330 
        
1 – 2 0.3206 0.4896 0.1904 0.3706 0.0889 0.523 0.1203 
t(1 – 2) 8.52 5.62 2.05 4.39 1.05 5.32 1.18 
 
σD is the volatility used by the firm in calculating the value of option grants, disclosed in Form 
10-K.  σH is historical stock-price volatility.  σI is implied volatility, calculated using the prices 
of traded call and put options.  The regressions include fixed effects for industry-year for the 
pooled and industry for the year-by-year regressions, where industry is determined at the 3 digit 
SIC code level.  
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 TABLE 5 
Regressions Examining Whether Firms’ Propensity to Incorporate Forward-Looking 
Information in Estimating Expected Volatility is related to the Relative Magnitudes of Historical 
and Implied Volatilities 
 
εσβσββσβσβασ +×+×++++= IHIHyearinduD IMPHIIMPHIIMPHI ___ 54321,  
 
 Pooled 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
1 0.2679 0.4059 0.4324 0.5418 -0.0368 0.4328 0.2057 
t(1) 4.88 2.79 3.03 3.82 -0.32 2.57 1.93 
 
 
      
2 0.7079 0.4998 0.5812 0.1881 0.9635 0.3363 0.9668 
t(2) 9.97 2.47 3.59 0.99 6.07 1.63 6.81 
 
 
      
3 -0.0052 -0.0097 0.011 -0.0877 -0.0125 -0.106 -0.0142 
t(3) -0.39 -0.27 0.44 -2.81 -0.35 -1.83 -0.46 
 
 
      
4 0.6004 0.5064 0.2018 0.5535 0.8989 0.2783 1.0971 
t(4) 8.39 2.93 1.04 3.12 5.80 1.40 4.62 
 
 
      
5 -0.5909 -0.4286 -0.2519 -0.1667 -0.8657 -0.1338 -1.0849 
t(5) -7.49 -2.02 -1.31 -0.81 -4.90 -0.60 -4.77 
        
Adj. R2 75.36% 65.65% 77.74% 71.37% 71.62% 68.52% 81.05% 
 
       
N 1,991 283 313 350 385 330 330 
 
       
1 + 4 0.8682 0.9123 0.6342 1.0953 0.8621 0.7111 1.3027 
t(1 + 4) 9.63 4.04 2.64 4.82 4.48 2.73 5.00 
        
2 + 5 0.117 0.0712 0.3294 0.0214 0.0977 0.2025 -0.1181 
t(2 + 5) 1.10 0.24 1.31 0.08 0.41 0.67 -0.44 
 
σD is the volatility used by the firm in calculating the value of option grants, disclosed in Form 
10-K.  σH is historical stock-price volatility.  σI is implied volatility, calculated using the prices 
of traded call and put options.  HI_IMP is a dummy variable that equals 1 if σI > σH and 0 
otherwise.  The regressions include fixed effects for industry-year for the pooled and industry for 
the year-by-year regressions, where industry is determined at the 3 digit SIC code level.  
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TABLE 6 
Regressions Examining Whether Firms’ Propensity to Incorporate Forward-Looking 
Information in Estimating Expected Volatility is related to Managerial Incentives to Understate 
the Option Expense   
 
εσβσββσβσβασ +×+×++++= IHIHyearinduD IMPHIIMPHIIMPHI ___ 54321,  
 
 Incentives Measured on the Basis of 
Option Holdings by Executives 
Industries partitioned on the basis of 
Option Granting Intensity 
 Low 
Holdings 
High 
Holdings 
 
High-Low 
Low 
Intensity 
High 
Intensity 
 
High-Low 
1 0.6785 0.3202 -0.3583 0.5294 -0.0248 -0.5542 
t(1) 4.69 3.75 -2.13 7.17 -0.31 -5.07 
       
2 0.1281 0.6175 0.4894 0.4571 0.9805 0.5234 
t(2) 0.77 5.54 2.45 4.94 8.76 3.60 
       
3 -0.026 0.0125 0.0385 0.0039 -0.0107 -0.0146 
t(3) -1.36 0.49 1.21 0.25 -0.4 -0.47 
       
4 0.0674 0.5885 0.5211 0.3992 0.7787 0.3795 
t(4) 0.42 5.17 2.65 4.33 6.86 2.60 
       
5 0.0508 -0.5921 -0.6429 -0.376 -0.7956 -0.4196 
t(5) 0.29 -4.76 -3.02 -3.7 -6.28 -2.58 
       
Adj. R2 74.21% 74.68%  72.89% 79.11%  
       
N 984 982  1,401 590  
       
1 + 4 0.7459 0.9088 -0.1629 0.9286 0.7539 -0.1747 
t(1+4) 3.45 6.39 -0.63 7.86 5.42 -0.96 
       
2 + 5 0.1788 0.0254 0.1534 0.081 0.1849 0.1039 
t(2+5) 0.75 0.15 0.53 0.59 1.09 0.48 
 
σD is the volatility used by the firm in calculating the value of option grants, disclosed in Form 
10-K.  σH is historical stock-price volatility.  σI is implied volatility, calculated using the prices 
of traded call and put options.  HI_IMP is a dummy variable that equals 1 if σI > σH and 0 
otherwise.  The regressions are pooled across time and include fixed effects for industry-year, 
where industry is determined at the 3 digit SIC code level.  The sample is partitioned in two 
ways.  First, firm-years are classified as strong incentives if their ratio of the average total 
holdings of options by executives to share outstanding exceeds the median across all firms in the 
same year.  Second, firm-years are partitioned on the basis of the option granting intensity of 
their industry.  Firms in 2-digit SIC codes in the 30s (manufacturing, partial), 70s and 80s 
(services) are classified as high option intensity industries as per Huson et al. (2001). 
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TABLE 7  
Tests Examining Measurement Error in σH and σI  
 
Panel A: Mean squared errors of realized volatility with respect to σH and σI 
 
 N (a): Mean (σR-σI)2 (b): Mean (σR-σH)2 (a)/(b) 
All observations 1,991 0.0464 0.0444 1.05 
σI  σH 1,327 0.0633 0.0507 1.25 
σI > σH 664 0.0379 0.0412 0.92 
 
Panel B: Absolute errors of realized volatility with respect to σH and σI 
 
 N (a): Mean |σR-σI| (b): Mean |σR-σH| (a)/(b) 
All observations 1,991 0.1398 0.1396 1.00 
σI  σH 1,327 0.1641 0.1544 1.06 
σI > σH 664 0.1276 0.1322 0.97 
 
σR is the realized volatility, calculated using monthly stock returns.  σH is historical stock-price 
volatility.  σI is implied volatility, calculated using the prices of traded call and put options.  σD 
is the volatility used by the firm in calculating the value of option grants, disclosed in Form 10-
K. 
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TABLE 8 
Historical and Implied Volatilities as Benchmarks for 
Assessing Bias in Disclosed Volatility 
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 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
1 0.0847  0.0722 
t(1) 8.59  7.04 
    
2  0.0691 0.0459 
t(2)  6.37 4.12 
    
Adj. R2 29.63% 29.00% 31.67% 
    
N 1,991 1,991 1,991 
 
σR is the realized volatility, calculated using monthly stock returns.  σD is the volatility used by 
the firm in calculating the value of option grants, disclosed in Form 10-K.  Thus, σR – σD 
measures the firm’s forecast error in estimating future volatility.  HI_HIST (HI_IMP) is an 
indicator variable equal to one when historical (implied) volatility is greater than disclosed 
volatility.  The regressions are pooled across time and include fixed effects for industry-year, 
where industry is determined at the 3 digit SIC code level. 
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TABLE 9 
Sensitivity Analyses 
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 Log Transformed Volatilities Only December Fiscal Year Firms  Strike Price within 5% of Stock Price 
 Low 
Holdings 
High 
Holdings 
 
High-Low 
Low 
Holdings 
High 
Holdings 
 
High-Low 
Low 
Holdings 
High 
Holdings 
 
High-Low 
1 0.6944 0.3539 -0.3405 0.7885 0.2752 -0.5133 0.8376 0.3833 -0.4543 
t(1) 4.89 3.96 -2.03 5.12 2.76 -2.80 5.72 3.13 -2.38 
          
2 0.1285 0.5424 0.4139 0.083 0.722 0.639 0.1066 0.6566 0.5500 
t(2) 0.81 4.93 2.15 0.47 5.3 2.86 0.64 3.95 2.34 
          
3 -0.0165 0.0028 0.0193 -0.0217 0.0225 0.0442 -0.0058 0.0403 0.0461 
t(3) -1.04 0.14 0.76 -1.04 0.73 1.19 -0.27 1.17 1.13 
          
4 0.0062 0.5169 0.5107 -0.2078 0.6654 0.8732 -0.2218 0.5336 0.7554 
t(4) 0.04 4.57 2.63 -1.18 4.56 3.81 -1.28 2.68 2.86 
          
5 0.0774 -0.501 -0.5784 0.2782 -0.7431 -1.0213 0.2249 -0.6378 -0.8627 
t(5) 0.47 -4.10 -2.80 1.47 -4.64 -4.12 1.24 -3.05 -3.12 
          
Adj. R2 74.75% 75.73%  73.86% 72.66%  76.71% 76.54%  
          
N 984 982  816 743  630 535  
          
1 + 4 0.7006 0.8708 0.1702 0.5807 0.9406 0.3599 0.6159 0.9169 0.301 
t(1+4) 3.30 6.04 0.66 2.48 5.33 1.23 2.71 3.92 0.92 
          
2 + 5 0.2059 0.0414 -0.1645 0.3613 -0.0211 -0.3824 0.3315 0.0188 -0.3127 
t(2+5) 0.90 0.25 -0.58 1.40 -0.10 -1.15 1.35 0.07 -0.86 
 
σD is the volatility used by the firm in calculating the value of option grants, disclosed in Form 10-K.  σH is historical stock-price 
volatility.  σI is implied volatility, calculated using the prices of traded call and put options.  HI_IMP is a dummy variable that equals 1 if 
σI > σH and 0 otherwise.  The regressions are pooled across time and include fixed effects for industry-year, where industry is determined 
at the 3 digit SIC code level.  The sample is partitioned based on the ratio of average total holdings of options by executives to share 
outstanding.  
